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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
.State of Utah 
SOUTH EAST FURNITURE COMPANY, 
a Corporation of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Operating as The Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah. 
ZELPH S. CALDER, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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In 
The Supreme C9ourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
SOUTH EAST FURNITURE COlVIP ANY, 
a Corporation of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Operating as The Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEME'NT 
This case concerns the self-organization of labor. 
The plaintiff corporation is engaged in the sale and 
manufacture of furniture and other kindred com-
modities. In round numbers. its employees consist 
of about sixty persons, divided in two substantially 
equal group's, consisting of 
(1) cabinet makers, repairmen, truck driv .. 
ers, warehouse men, helpers on trucks, 
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helper linoleum _layers, packers, .linoleum 
layer, .. janitor) finisher, pickers, carp,et 
sewer, shipping clerks, and finisher help-
ers- (hereinafter called factory employees), 
and 
(2) credit manager, assistant credit mana-
. ger, coll~ction hostess, stenographers, book 
keepers, cashie-rs, S,alesmen, supervisors, 
foren1an, and other employees (hereinafter 
.referred to as white~coll~r e1nployees), who 
·. have the power to '' hire and fire.'' 
The factory employees sought to organize for coi. 
lective ·bargaining purposes. They sought the se.r 
vices of the Congress of· Industrial O:rg;aniza,tion 
(hereinafter referred to as. the C. I. 0.), Local 
Union No. 1068, to serve as their ba.tgaining agent 
for the plaintiff with respect to rates of pay, wages, 
hours Qf employnient~ and other conditions of em-
ploymen~.. The. plaintiff refused to recognize such 
union as the bargaining agent1 because it did not 
represent all of' its white-collar employees. The 
Local union countered, stating in substance that they 
had no jurisdiction ·over clerical office help,' a.nd that 
their union does·· riot admit- salesmen into their 
organization. 
The 1937' legislature p·assed· what· is ·commonly 
known ·as the ''Little ·Wagner Aet,' 1 -o:f··as defined 
by the 
Laws of Utah 1937, Chapter 55, Page 117, 
the· Labor Rela,tions Act . As pertinent, this Act 
provides: 
"It is hereby declared to be· the policy of 
the Stat~ of Utah to eliminate the causes 
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3 
of certain substantial obstructions to the 
free operation of industry and to 1nitiga.te 
and eliininate these obstructions \vhen they 
have occurred by encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining, and 
by protecting the exercise by "\vorkers of 
full freedon1 of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing, for the purpose of ne-
gotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutna1 aiel or pro-
tection.'' 
Section 8 also provides : 
"Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their ovvn choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities, 
for the purpose of collective bargaining for 
their mutual aid or protection.'' 
Section 4 thereof sets up the Industrial Commis-
sion as the Labor Relations Board to handle labor 
disputes, including unfai.r labor practices (Sec. 9). 
'Vha.t unit of employees shall he the exclusive rep-
resentative of all the employees? 
Section 10 (h) : 
'' Th~ board shall decide in each case 
whether, in order to insure to employees 
the full benefit of their right to self-organi-
zation and to collective bargaining, and 
otherwise to effectuate the policies of this 
Act, the unit ap·propriate for the purposes 
of collective bargaining shall be the em-
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4 
ployer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or sub-
division thereof.'' 
Section 11 empowers the hoard with authority to 
prevent: 
(a) Unfair labor practices. 
{b) To conduct hearings and issue orders. 
(c) To report hearings. 
(d) To notify its orders. 
(e) To petition the Supreme Court. 
(f) For the aggrieved party to petition the 
Supreme Court. 
The plaintiff brings this dispute before this Court 
under the authority of the last-mentioned Section 
(f), and as pertinent it reads: 
"'Any person aggrieved by a final order, 
(of) the board granting or denying, or de-
nying in whole or in part the relief soughtJ 
may obtain a review of such order in the 
Supreme Court of Utah, etc.'' (I tal. ours). 
The Utah Labor Relations Board certified that the 
C. I. 0. was authorized and appointed by a majority 
of the employees, and ordered the plaintiff to enter 
into negotiations with the local C. I. 0. for the pur~ 
pose~ of collective bargaining "\\7ith respect to rates 
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other con-
dit~ons of employment. From such an order plain· 
tiff is attempting to get a revie\Y by this Court. 
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5 
It is our position that this Court can take no juris .. 
diction of this controversy because plaintiff is not 
asking for a review of a ''1inal order'' of the board 
as is contemplated by the statute. 
There has been no unfair labor practice filing, and 
hence no hearing could have been conducted by the 
board that would result in a final order, decree, or 
judgm.ent. Xhe mere interlocutory order certifying 
the collective bargaining agent, and ordering plain .. 
tiff to negotiate vvith them, is. only one process in 
the dispute which may o:i· may not involYe the real 
dispute of any unfair labor ·p~ractice. 
For this Court to concern itself with every minor 
and incidental ruling of the board as a separate re-
view item, would unduly burden this Court and make 
for a multiplicity of actions. It would delay, clog, 
and retard the speedy settlement of labor disputes; 
therefore, it would be against public policy for this 
.Court to take jurisdiction of this case. 
AUTHORITIES 
It will be noted that the Utah Labor Relations Act, 
Chapter 55, page ·117, Laws of Utah 1937, was 
drafted from the National Labor Relations Act, 
(New) United States Code Annotated, 1939', Oumu .. 
lative Docket Part 2'9- Labor. The Acts are pra.c .. 
1.ically identical excep·t that the Utah Act uses "intra 
state commerce" instead of "inter-state commerce" 
and there is a slight variance in the procedure· set .. 
ting up the Labor Relations Board. 
In thP. case of 
AmP.rican Federation of Labor Et al. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 3d8 
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6 
U. S. 401, decided January 2:- 1940, the 
syllabus reads : 
''A certification by the National Labor Re-
lations Board under Section 9 (c) of the 
~ a.tional Labor Relations Act, that a par-
ticular organization of workers in the col-
lective bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in a designated unit, is not an order 
reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia or a circuit court of 
appeals, under Section 10 (f) of the Act.'' 
''The Act does not provide for court review 
of such certification except as incidental to 
review of an order restraining an unfair 
labor practice. '' 
It will be noted that Section 9 (c) a~d Section 10 
(f), referred to above, are identical with Sections 
10 (c) and 11 (f) of the Utah Labor Relations Act, 
except that in the latter there appears .a typograph-
ical error, in that at the end of the ,first line of the 
Utah Act appears. a comma where in the National 
Act there appears the word ''of.'' The wording 
respectively hl : 
''Any person aggrieved by a final order, 
the board, etc. '' and 
'' Any person aggrieved by a final order ·of 
the board, etc. '' 
The foregoing cited A. F. of L. case Reems to be 
on ''all fours'' .. with our contention in the instant 
case. Said A. F. of L. case is: 
''A review of a judgment (by the circuit 
court of appeals) di~missing for want of 
jurisdiction a petition to review the certifi-
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7 
eation by the National .l~abor Relations 
Board of an organization of longshoremen 
as representative of workers.'' 
The judgment of the United States ,Supreu1e Court 
affirmed the judgment of the said Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
The said A. F. of L .. case cites Federal cases. orig-
inating.in Utah: 
Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railway Co. 
305 U.S. 117; and 
Utah Fuel Co. , .... National -Bitun1inous Coal 
Com. 306 U. S. 56. 
For other authorities see 
N.L.R.B. v. Falk Corporation, ,308 U.S. 
453, 60 Supreme. Court 307; 
N.L.R.B. v. I.B.E.W. 60 Sup. Ct. 306; 
., r A. F. L. v. N. L. R. B. 60 Sup. Ct. 300. 
Jn conclusion -we contend} because of the''National 
and State Labor Relations Acts being the same, that 
the ab:ove· cited ~authorities declare the la.wl in u·tah 
the same ·as . if this Supreme Court had given the 
. . 
opinions. 
We respectfully submit~ and so move, that plaintiff's 
petition be dismissed for 'vant of jurisdiction of this 
Court. 
Respectfully s·uomitted~ 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah. 
ZELFH S. CALDER, 
\:.. As-sistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Ia the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SOUTH EAST FURNITURE 
COMPANY, a corporation of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, operating as 
the UTAH LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD, 
Defendant. 
No. 6297 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief 
ROMNEY & NELSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
SO·UTH EAST FURNITURE 
COMPANY, a. corporation of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, operating a.s 
the UTAH LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD, 
Defendant. 
No. 6297 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief 
STATEMENT 
The defendant, in its brief, has not attempted to 
answer any of the points set forth in the plaintiff's 
brief, and, upon this basis, we assume that defendant's 
failure to so answer constitutes an admission of the 
truth of the points set forth in plaintiff's brief. 
Defendant's brief deals solely and entirely with 
its contention that the review herein should be dismissed 
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for want of jurisdiction of this Court. Our reply brief, 
therefore, is confined entirely to a rebuttal of the argu-
ment made by defendant in support of its single con-
tention. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant bases its argument entirely upon the 
ruling in the case of American Federation of Labor, 
et al, vs. National Labor Relations Board, 308 U. S. 401; 
and defendant contends that this case is on ''all fours'' 
with the case at bar. We do not agree with this con-
tention. 
An analysis of the steps in the proceeding before 
the defendant Board, in the instant case, should aid in 
a clear understanding of the matter. The essential steps 
are as follows : 
July 29, 1940 - The union applied to defendant 
Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the 
employes, and, coincidentally, preferred charges against 
the plaintiff company for alleged discrimination, coer-
cion, and intimidation of the employes. 
July 30, 1940- The defendant Board conducted an 
informal hearing pursuant to the said communication 
from the union. 
July 31, 1940 - Following a purported investiga-
tion, the defendant Board certified the union as the 
appropriate unit for collective bargaining. 
August 2, 1940 - A further informal hearing was 
held before the defendant Board, for the ostensible pur-
pose of conciliating and mediating the controversy. 
2 
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.A.ugust 7, 1940 - The defendant Board served no-
tice upon the plaintiff of a hearing to be held on August 
9, 1940, and instructed plaintiff and others to be present. 
August 16, 1940 - The defendant Board adopted, 
by a vote of two to one, Resolution No. 2030, reading in 
part as follows : 
''BE IT RESOLVED AND ORDERED, that 
the Utah Labor Relations Board does hereby 
certify that United Industrial Local Union No. 
1068 was authorized and appointed by a majority 
of the employees engaged and employed in the 
department hereinbefore· found by the Utah Labor 
Relations Board as the appropriate unit for col-
lective bargaining purposes with the Southeast 
Furniture Company; therefore, the 8 outheast 
Furniture Company is hereby ordered and di-
rected without further delay to enter into nego-
tiations for the purpose of collective bargaining 
with said local union with respect to rates of pay, 
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions 
of employment." (Italics ours) 
In the case of American Federation of Labor vs. 
National Labor Relations Board, cited in defendant's 
brief, upon the request of a rival union, the National 
Labor Relations Board certified the union as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of ail of the workers in 
the unit. The Board made no order requiring the em-
ployer to bargain with the union, and there was no ques-
tion of the refusal of the employer to bargain. The 
petition for review, in fact, was filed by the union 
against whom the order was made. The court held, in 
substance, that a mere certification was not a proper 
matter for review by the court. In its decision, the 
court traced the legislative history of the National Labor 
3 
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Relations Act and, among other things, quoted from 
Senate Report No. 573 of the Committee on Education 
and Labor, 74th Congress, First Session, page 14, as 
follows: 
''There is no more reason for court review 
prior to an election than for court review prior 
to a hearing. But if subsequently the Board 
makes an order predicated upon the election, such 
as an order to bargain collectively with elected 
representatives, then the entire election proce-
dure becomes part of the record upon which the 
order of the Board is based, and is fully review-
able by an aggrieved party in the Federal courts 
in the manner provided in Section 10. And this 
review would include within its scope the action 
of the Board in determining the appropriate unit 
for purposes of the election. This provides a com-
plete guarantee against arbitrary action by the 
Board.'' (Italics ours) 
The court further quotes the explanation of the Bill 
on the Senate floor by the Committee chairman, as fol-
lows: 
''It provides for review in the courts only 
after the election has. been held and the Board 
has ordered the employer to do something predi-
cated upon the results of an election.'' 
The defendant further cites the case of National 
Labor Relations Board vs. International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, 60 Supreme Court 306. In this case, 
two rival unions both claimed a majority. An election 
was held which was close. The Labor Board ordered a 
run-off election, for the purpose of determining whether 
the union receiving the largest number of votes should 
be the representative, or whether there should be no 
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representative. The excluded union appealed to the Cir-
cuit Court for review, and that court set aside the 
Board's direction. The case came to the Supreme Court 
upon certiorari. The latter court merely held that the 
direction for an election is but a part of the rep res en-
tation proceeding authorized by the Act and is not sub-
ject to review. In the said case, there was no affirma-
tive order. 
Defendant further cites the case of National Labor 
Relations Board vs. Falk Corporation, 308 U. S. 453, 
60 Supreme Court 307. Insofar as this case touches upon 
the question at bar, the facts are that the Labor Board 
directed an election under certain conditions. The Board 
filed a petition with the Circuit Court to enforce its 
order of election. The Circuit Court modified the order 
of election and granted a petition for enforcement of it. 
The Supreme Court, upon review, decided that there can 
be no court review until the Board issues an order and 
requires the employer to do something predicated upon 
the result of an election. (Italics ours) This case gives 
additional credence to our contention that where the 
Board does order the employer to do something predi-
cated upon certification, the matter is reviewable. 
The cases of Shields vs. Utah Idaho Central RO!ilway 
Co., 305 U. S. 117, and Utah Fuel Comp·any vs. National 
Bituminous Coal Com., 306 U. S. 56, have no bearing 
upon the issues of this case whatever. 
It may be contended, and correctly so, that in this 
case, there was no due hearing upon due notice of any 
alleged unfair labor charge which would form a suitable 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
basis for an order by the defendant Board, requiring 
the plaintiff to do the affirmative act, to-wit: "Without 
further delay to enter into negotiations for the purpose 
of collective bargaining with said local union with/ re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment.'' We grant that the 
defendant Board attempted to "cut across lots," in 
arriving at its order, and this tendency upon the part 
of the defendant Board is the very basis for our petition 
for review. However, regardless of the manner in which 
the defendant Board arrived at its affirmative order, the 
order, nevertheless, does, in fact, require the plaintiff 
to do an affirmative thing, and, if the plaintiff refuses 
to do so, it lays itself open to the consequences of an 
application on the part of the defendant Board to this 
court for affirmative relief. The plaintiff in this pro-
ceeding has followed the other alternative of applying 
to the court for review. 
The case of Urwited Employes , Association vs. N a-
tional Labor Relations Board,. argued in the Circuit 
Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit, on March 18, 
1938, reported in 96 Fed. (2d) 875, presents some good 
reasoning with respect to the nature of mere certifica-
tion, as compared to affirmative command. In that case, 
the Board merely certified the union as the bargaining 
agent, and the court states in part as follows: 
''It does determine that question which may 
be reviewed at the proper time by this court, but 
that time arrives when the Board 01"ders the 
compa;ny to do something. Here the Union is 
merely certified as 'the exclusive representative 
of all such employes for the purpose of collective 
6 
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bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment.' Th,is is not a final order. It is in fact 
not an order at all, but simply the certification 
of a fact which may be entirely ignored and dis-
regarded by the ~4.ssociation and the Company. 
The Company may go on with impunity bargain-
ing with the Association just as though no certif-
ication had been made. Until the Board makes 
a final order co1nmanding the Company to do 
something, its jurisdiction is exclusive arnd com-
plete and its order may not be reversed or set 
aside if there is any substantial evidence to sup-
port it. Consequently until the Board makes a 
final order by which some person is aggrieved 
the proceedings of the Board may not be judici-
ally reviewed or enjoined. * * * If and 
when the Board by a final order directs the peti-
tioner in this case to cease and desist from any 
of its practices or to do anything, the petitioner 
may obtain a review of that order by this court 
which may then examine the regularity of the 
proceedings by which the Board found that the 
Union was the exclusive representative of the 
Association for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining, but until then both the Association and 
the Company may proceed just as though no 
election had been held or certification made.'' 
(Italics ours) 
To summarize, we respectfully call the court's 
attention to the following facts : 
The defendant Board originally ce-rtified the union 
as the bargaining agent for the employes in question, 
under date of July 31, 1940. The defendant Board, on 
August 16, 1940, merely reaffirmed its previous deci-
sion, and affirmatively ordered and directed the plain-
tiff, without further delay to enter into negotiations for 
the purpose of collective bargaining with the said union. 
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While it is granted that this affirmative order of the 
defendant Board was made without proper hearing, and 
in the absence of adequate findings and conclusions, 
nevertheless, unless this court relieves the plaintiff of 
the effects thereof, through this proceeding, the affirma-
tive order of the said Board is as binding upon this 
plaintiff as if it had been arrived at after fu~l and 
complete proceedings, as set forth in the Act. 
It is, therefore, our contention that this proceeding 
is properly before this Court for review at this time, and 
for the reasons set forth in our original brief, the 
matter should be remanded to the defendant Board, with 
instructions to conduct a secret ballot and proceed other-
wise as indicated in our said brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON, 
.Attorneys for Plailntiff. 
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